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The ''Trent'' Affair was an international diplomatic incident that occurred during the American Civil War. On November 8, 1861, the , commanded by Union Captain Charles Wilkes, intercepted the British mail packet RMS ''Trent'' and removed, as contraband of war, two Confederate diplomats, James Mason and John Slidell. The envoys were bound for Britain and France to press the Confederacy's case for diplomatic recognition and to lobby for possible financial and military support, in the name of cotton diplomacy. Public reaction in the United States was to celebrate the capture and rally against Britain, threatening war. In the Confederate States, the hope was that the incident would lead to a permanent rupture in Anglo-American relations and possibly even war or at least diplomatic recognition by Britain. Confederates realized their independence potentially depended on intervention by Britain and France. In Britain, the public disapproved at this violation of neutral rights and insult to their national honor. The British government demanded an apology and the release of the prisoners while it took steps to strengthen its military forces in Canada and the Atlantic. President Abraham Lincoln and his top advisors did not want to risk war with Britain over this issue. After several tense weeks, the crisis was resolved when the Lincoln administration released the envoys and disavowed Captain Wilkes's actions without a formal apology. Mason and Slidell resumed their voyage to Britain but failed in their goal of achieving diplomatic recognition. ==General background== The Confederacy and its president, Jefferson Davis, believed from the beginning that European dependence on cotton for its textile industry would lead to diplomatic recognition and intervention, in the form of mediation. Historian Charles Hubbard: The Union's main focus in foreign affairs was just the opposite: to prevent any British recognition of the Confederacy. Notwithstanding a relatively minor border incident in the Pacific Northwest, Anglo-American relations had steadily improved throughout the 1850s. The issues of the Oregon territory, British involvement in Texas, and the Canadian border dispute had all been resolved in the 1840s. Secretary of State William H. Seward, the primary architect of American foreign policy during the war, intended to maintain the policy principles that had served the country well since the American Revolution—non-intervention by the United States in the affairs of other countries and resistance to foreign intervention in the affairs of the United States and other countries in the Western hemisphere.〔Jones pp. 2–3. Hubbard p. 17. Mahin p. 12.〕 British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston urged a policy of neutrality. His international concerns were centered in Europe, where he had to watch both Napoleon III's ambitions in Europe and Bismarck's rise in Prussia. During the Civil War, British reactions to American events were shaped by past British policies and their own national interests, both strategically and economically. In the Western Hemisphere, as relations with the United States improved, Britain had become cautious about confronting the United States over issues in Central America. As a naval power, Britain had a long record of insisting that neutral nations honor (abide by) its blockades of hostile countries. From the earliest days of the war, this perspective would guide the British away from taking any action that might have been viewed in Washington as a direct challenge to the Union blockade. From the perspective of the South, British policy amounted to ''de facto'' support for the Union blockade and caused great frustration.〔Berwanger p. 874. Hubbard p. 18. Baxter, ''The British Government and Neutral Rights'', p. 9. Baxter wrote, "the British government, while defending the rights of British merchants and shipowners, kept one eye on the precedents and the other on the future interests of the mistress of the sea."〕 The Russian Minister in Washington, Eduard de Stoeckl, noted, "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal dissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which it has difficulty in disguising." De Stoeckl advised his government that Britain would recognize the Confederate States at its earliest opportunity. Cassius Clay, the U.S. minister in Russia, stated, "I saw at a glance where the feeling of England was. They hoped for our ruin! They are jealous of our power. They care neither for the South nor the North. They hate both."〔Graebner p. 60–61.〕 At the beginning of the Civil War, the U.S. minister to the Court of St. James was Charles Francis Adams. He made clear that Washington considered the war strictly an internal insurrection affording the Confederacy no rights under international law. Any movement by Britain towards officially recognizing the Confederacy would be considered an unfriendly act towards the United States. Seward's instructions to Adams included the suggestion that it be made clear to Britain that a nation with widely scattered possessions, as well as a homeland that included Scotland and Ireland, should be very wary of "set() a dangerous precedent."〔Mahin p. 47. Taylor p. 177.〕 Lord Lyons, an experienced diplomat, was the British minister to the U.S. He warned London about Seward: Despite his distrust of Seward... throughout 1861 Lyons maintained a "calm and measured" diplomacy that contributed to a peaceful resolution to the ''Trent'' crisis.〔Dubrulle pg. 1234.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Trent Affair」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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